Gaza 3 Years On: Impunity over Accountability
Israel's unwillingness to investigate violations of international law in the Gaza Strip

Issued 28 August 2017

Between 7 July 2014 and 26 August 2014, for almost 51 days, Israel launched a military offensive in the Gaza Strip codenamed "Operation Protective Edge" (OPE). The operation killed 2,251 Palestinians, the vast majority of whom were civilians, including 299 women and 551 children. The operation also caused massive destruction to 18,000 homes and other civilian property, including hospitals and vital infrastructure.¹

Adalah, together with Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, filed a series of complaints to the Israeli Military Advocate General (MAG) and the Israeli Attorney General (AG) demanding independent investigations into suspected violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL) during the 2014 operation, and the criminal prosecutions of perpetrators.

However, three years after OPE, the handling of these complaints by the Israeli authorities has proven what previous experience with the Israeli investigatory system has long made clear: Israel is unwilling to conduct genuine, independent investigations into suspected war crimes, and does not hold those responsible to account, as required by international law.² This situation continues to be the case even after the Israeli military established its Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism (FFAM) following OPE, which was supposed to improve its investigative processes.

The UN Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on the 2014 Gaza conflict, which released a report of its findings in June 2015, extensively documented and investigated numerous allegations of widespread and systematic violations of international law during the 2014 operation, and raised serious concerns that certain attacks by the Israeli military may amount to war crimes.³ The CoI also raised serious questions regarding the thoroughness of Israel's investigative mechanisms.⁴

Three years after OPE and more than two years after the publication of the CoI report, it is clear that the CoI’s recommendations join the long list of UN recommendations that remain unimplemented and ultimately ignored by Israel. The failure to implement these recommendations allows for impunity to continue for violations of IHL and IHRL by Israel.

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¹ OCHA, "Key figures on the 2014" hostilities: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/key-figures-2014-hostilities.
⁴ UN CoI report, para. 633.
This short report addresses the failures and shortcomings of the Israeli investigatory system in holding to account those responsible for grave breaches of international law during OPE, and the clear unwillingness to provide justice for victims and ensure the necessary guarantees of non-repetition. It outlines the criminal complaints filed by Adalah and Al Mezan to the Israeli authorities and their dismissal; addresses the newly-founded FFAM and its shortcomings; provides three case examples of serious criminal complaints that have been closed by the MAG and appealed to the AG to no avail to date; discusses Israel's non-compliance, non-cooperation and non-implementation of recommendations by UN human rights bodies; and finally analyzes the many obstacles ingrained in the Israeli system that allow for impunity to prevail.

I. Criminal complaints filed to the Israeli Military Advocate General (MAG) and the Israeli Attorney General (AG)

Between July and September 2014, Adalah and Al Mezan filed complaints jointly to the MAG and the AG regarding 28 incidents of suspected IHL and IHRL violations during OPE. The organizations demanded that the authorities open independent criminal investigations into each of the cases and to prosecute and hold to account those found to be responsible.

The cases concerned severe events that resulted in the killing and serious injury of Palestinian civilians, including women and children, and the massive destruction of civilian objects. The evidence in these cases suggested that the attacks were carried out in violation of the principles of distinction and proportionality, which could amount to grave breaches of IHL. These cases mostly concerned incidents of:

- Direct attacks on homes causing many civilian deaths and injuries;
- Direct attacks on children (e.g. the four Bakr children playing on the beach and the Shuheibar children feeding pigeons on a house rooftop);
- Direct attacks on five UNRWA schools that were sheltering civilians;
- The bombing of mosques, hospitals and a shelter for people with severe disabilities;
- Attacks on civilian infrastructure and the municipality workers fixing them.

The table below summarizes the status of these complaints based on the MAG's responses:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military's response</th>
<th>No investigation opened</th>
<th>Investigation opened and then closed</th>
<th>Still under examination (by the FFAM)</th>
<th>Still under investigation by the Military Police</th>
<th>No response to date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases/incidents</td>
<td>13 (2 appeals pending)</td>
<td>1 (appeal pending)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results show that three years after the Gaza offensive, 46.4% (13 of 28) of the complaints filed by Adalah and Al Mezan were referred to the FFAM for examination and then closed, without opening a criminal investigation or ordering further action against those involved. 43% of the complaints (12 of 28) remain under examination by the FFAM or received no response.

In addition to these joint complaints, Al Mezan filed an additional 105 complaints. 94 were filed to the MAG in relation to incidents of attacks on civilians and civilian objects, looting and torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and 11 were filed to the Inspector of Interrogee Complaints (IIC)\(^6\) in relation to incidents of torture/ill-treatment by the Israel Security Agency (ISA) (also known as the Shin Bet, GSS or the Shabak). The MAG has sent no information to Al Mezan on the receipt or status of nine of these complaints and we therefore have no information as to whether or not they are being processed.

To date, Al Mezan was informed of the closure of 26 files, two of them by the IIC and 24 of them by the MAG. Of the closed files by the MAG, 11 underwent criminal investigation, during which seven victims gave evidence at the Erez crossing to Israel’s Military Police. These 11 files are the only files in which the MAG opened a criminal investigation (11%) and all of them were closed afterwards on the basis of “insufficient evidence”. Interestingly, all of these files concerned incidents of looting and/or torture/ill-treatment during detention and not a single investigation was opened by the MAG concerning attacks on civilians and civilian objects.

In sum, the Israeli authorities have failed to investigate the majority of cases that raise serious concerns of severe violations of international law. To date not a single indictment has been issued. Notably, 11 of the 14 criminal investigations conducted in the complaints filed by Al Mezan and Adalah concern incidents of looting by Israeli soldiers and the torture/ill-treatment of civilians in military detention. These facts also speak to the deliberate focus of proceedings on low-level or marginal perpetrators, despite the availability of information on serious crimes committed by senior officials and military commanders.

II. The Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism (FFAM)

The FFAM, established after the 2014 Gaza operation, is purportedly the result of the state’s efforts to implement the recommendations of a 2013 report by the Turkel Commission. The Israeli government formed the Commission in 2010, in part, to examine whether its mechanisms for investigating IHL violations complies with international law.\(^7\)

The FFAM's purpose is reportedly to collect information and relevant materials limited only to "exceptional incidents" that occurred during OPE, where the MAG has decided that "additional information is required".\(^8\) These materials are then referred to the MAG, the body that determines whether or not to open a criminal investigation into the cases. In theory, the FFAM was supposed to work thoroughly and promptly, in as close a timeframe as possible to the date of the incident in question, in order to ensure that the investigation is prompt and effective. In fact, most of the complaints filed are effectively frozen under the FFAM’s purview, whereas many of them are closed after a claimed investigation by the FFAM without opening a criminal investigation and without disclosing any materials as required.

On 24 August 2016, the MAG issued a press release with updates on a few cases under examination (Update No. 5). Here the MAG informed that it decided to close these cases without opening criminal

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\(^6\) The Interrogee-Complaints Inspector is the authority in charge of examining complaints of torture/ill-treatment against those under investigation by the Israel Security Agency (ISA).


\(^8\) UN CoI report, para. 612. The UN High Commissioner noted the limited scope of this mechanism. See HCRC, supra note 6, para. 32.
investigations.\(^9\) No further press releases or updates appear on the website of the MAG; Update No. 5, issued one year ago, was the last public document issued by the MAG.

This update itself, which was issued two years after the end of the offensive, and the numbers provided by the MAG clearly indicate a violation of international law standards and the unwillingness to hold anyone to account. According to this update, the MAG received 500 complaints relating to 360 incidents that occurred during OPE; 220 of these incidents were transmitted to the FFAM, 80 of them (36%) were then closed by the MAG without opening a criminal investigation and 133 (60%) are still under the FFAM’s purview. Only 7 incidents out of the 360 (less than 2%) led to the opening of an investigation, with six of them ongoing, while one case – the Bakr boys case described below – was closed.

In many cases in which the MAG decided that no investigation would be opened - i.e. decided to close the file without further action - Adalah and Al Mezan requested the investigatory materials on which the MAG based its decision, including copies of witness statements and other testimonies collected. In summary, the MAG’s responses to such cases were as follows:

- **Secret evidence**: The materials collected by the FFAM and other intelligence materials cannot be revealed because they are classified;
- **Military necessity**: Certain incidents in question were undertaken based on military necessity (these arguments were written vaguely and did not include any supporting evidence);
- **No non-military witnesses**: The FFAM did not find any need or use in taking testimonies from non-military witnesses.

### III. Case Example - Attacks on UNRWA Schools Serving as Civilian Shelters

The UN Board of Inquiry (BoI) was established after the 2014 OPE to review and investigate incidents affecting or involving UN personnel and premises. The Israeli government cooperated with the UN BoI, in contrast to its refusal to cooperate with the UN CoI.

In the summary of its findings, the BoI concluded that Israel was responsible for striking seven UNRWA sites used as civilian shelters, in which 44 Palestinians were killed and 227 others were injured. In a cover letter accompanying the summary, the UN Secretary-General condemned the attacks stating: "It is a matter of the utmost gravity that those who looked to them for protection and who sought and were granted shelter there had their hopes and trust denied."\(^10\) Responding to the release of the BoI report, the Israeli government stated that the UNRWA incidents have been subject to thorough examinations, and criminal investigations have been launched where relevant.\(^11\) However, as noted, it appears that that these cases are being closed without any investigation or are still under the review of the FFAM, more than three years on.

One of the cases closed by the MAG concerned the attack nearby an UNRWA school in Rafah, in which 15 people were killed, including eight children, and at least 25 people were wounded.\(^12\) About

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12 UN CoI report, para. 440.
3,000 people were taking shelter in the school at the time. The military announced that it was aware of the fact that the school served as a shelter for civilians. However, it claimed that it was targeting three military operatives riding on a motorbike, and at the time of firing against the motorbike, it was "not able to discern in real-time the group of civilians that were outside the school" and that "it was not possible to divert the munitions" after the motorbike started to travel among the road bordering the wall, which surrounded the school. The MAG found that the targeting process accorded with international and domestic law, and thus, there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.

In October 2016, Adalah and Al Mezan appealed against the MAG’s decision not to open an investigation arguing that the Israeli military committed serious violations of the laws of war, which amount to war crimes. The appeal remains pending. The UN COI also examined this case and found that imprecise weapons were used, concluding that:

"The use of such weapons in the immediate vicinity of an UNRWA school sheltering civilians is highly likely to constitute an indiscriminate attack which, depending on the circumstances, may qualify as a direct attack against civilians, and may therefore amount to a war crime".

Human Rights Watch, which also carried out an in-depth documentation and investigation of three UNRWA school attacks, found that in this attack, the munitions used by the Israeli military in fact allows the operator to see the target even after the missile is launched and divert it in mid-course. Al Mezan, which has also documented this case, has identified the two people (and not three as stated by the Israeli authorities) on the motorbike as civilians and not combatants.

This case—which clearly indicates contrary findings by the UN and international and local human rights organizations from that of the Israeli military—also demonstrates the need for a more thorough and transparent investigation, and not a closure of the case file after two years without investigation. The findings show that this incident may be an unlawful, indiscriminate and disproportionate attack. However, the FFAM and MAG seem to merely make assertions about the targets, the timing of the munitions’ firing, and the selection of ammunition, concluding that there was nothing wrong with any of these decisions, and that lessons were learned. Moreover, in the words of the CoI, "Even though the attack against the UNRWA schools may not have been deliberate, the IDF is bound by the obligation of precautionary measures and verification of targets to avoid attacks directed by negligence at civilians or civilian objects".

IV. Case Example - Appeal against Case Closure: The Bakr Boys Case

A high-profile case in which the MAG opened an investigation was the killing of four boys from the Bakr family while they were playing football on the beach in Gaza. The case garnered extensive international media and public attention, especially due to its occurrence near a hotel where many foreign journalists were staying. In conducting its investigation, the Israeli military did not collect testimonies from these journalists or from Palestinian witnesses who were on site at the time of the

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14 See also International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Galic, case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement, 5 December 2003, para. 57.
15 UN Col report, para. 446.
17 UN Col, para. 447.
killing. The MAG closed the file in June 2015, contending that the area in which the boys were killed amounted to a justified, military target.  

The CoI was deeply disturbed by the closure of this case, stating that there were "strong indications that the actions of the IDF were not in conformity with international humanitarian law and that the investigation does not appear to have been carried out in a thorough manner."\(^{19}\)

In August 2015, Adalah and Al Mezan filed an appeal against the MAG's decision to close the file; two years later, the case is still pending before the AG with no response, despite repeated letters from the human rights organizations asking for a reply. The appeal process itself has no clear or transparent procedures, nor a timeframe for a decision. Directives issued by the AG in April 2015 set a deadline of 60 days for submitting appeals against the MAG's decisions. However, the directives contain no provisions regarding a timeline for the AG to issue his decision on the appeal itself.

The Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) in Gaza also submitted an appeal to the AG against the MAG's decision to close the case in August 2015. Despite providing the military with additional materials, sending several reminders and requesting access to the investigatory materials, PCHR was also unable to get any response from the MAG or the State Attorney regarding this case.\(^{20}\)

Prior to submitting the appeal, and following the MAG's decision to close the Bakr boys' case, PCHR, Adalah and Al Mezan requested access to the materials on which the decision was made. One month later, the organizations did not receive any reply, and then submitted the appeals in accordance with the 60-day deadline as required by the AG's directives. After numerous reminder letters and a telephone call, nine months later, the State Attorney's office contended that the MAG is willing to disclose certain materials from the investigation file, and that the human rights organizations should resubmit their appeals based on these materials. Accordingly, the three organizations addressed the MAG and the military police requesting access to the materials and yet, more than a year after the State Attorney's statement, no reply has been received.

V. Case Example - Appeal against Case Closure: The Abu Dahrouj Family Case

The case of the Abu Dahrouj family provides another illustration of Israel’s unwillingness to investigate. In this case, on the night of 22 August 2014, an Israeli warplane fired two missiles at a home belonging to the Abu Dahrouj family in central Gaza. The Israeli missile strike killed five members of the Abu Dahrouj family, including two children, and wounded multiple civilians and caused extensive damage to neighboring homes. Although the MAG acknowledged that the missile attack was carried out directly on a civilian home and did not target any combatant or military object, no investigation was opened and the case was closed without any action against those involved.

In this case, the MAG used vague and indecisive terminology, stating that “for an unclear reason, likely an unexpected technical malfunction”, the missile hit the family’s home. This language indicated that the MAG did not conduct a thorough and independent examination that was sufficient to determine whether or not it was necessary to open an investigation. The Israeli military also refused to provide any of the results of its probe or to detail the reason for its decision to refuse to

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19 UN CoI report, para. 663.

20 Information provided by Mohammed al-Alami, a lawyer from PCHR, on July 2017. Case on file with PCHR.
open a criminal investigation, claiming that all case materials are classified. Adalah and Al Mezan submitted an appeal in January 2017 against the decision not to conduct an investigation into the killing, reiterating that it constitutes a serious violation of IHL. The appeal remains pending.

VI. UN Recommendations on Accountability and the Lack of their Enforcement

In its report, the Col expressed its concern regarding "the persistent lack of implementation of recommendations – made by previous commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, United Nations treaty bodies, special procedures and other United Nations bodies, in particular the Secretary-General and OHCHR", noting that it "lies at the heart of the systematic recurrence of violations in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory". Two years after its publication, and following Israel's evasion of its recommendations, it seems clear that this report is now added to the long list of reports and recommendations that remain unimplemented by Israel.

On March 2016, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) released an initial report on the implementation of the CoI's recommendations on the 2014 Gaza conflict. In light of the information presented to the HCHR regarding Israel's handling of investigations, the HCHR reiterated "serious concerns regarding the lack of accountability related to past cycles of violence and escalation in Gaza and to incidents in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and in the access-restricted areas of the Gaza Strip". He asserted that, "the situation continues to deteriorate" and urged all parties to urgently implement all recommendations made by the CoI.

In his report, the HCHR emphasized the fact that no criminal indictments were issued based on any of the complaints filed or otherwise, including all of the cases submitted by Adalah, Al Mezan and other human rights organizations, except in one case of looting. The looting incident involved two soldiers who were accused of stealing NIS 2,420 (about US $635) from a home in the Shuja'iya neighborhood, the same neighborhood where more than 55 civilians, including 19 children and 14 women, were killed on 19-20 July 2014 as a result of Israeli military action that also led to the destruction of and damage to over 1,800 houses. Referring to this case, the CoI stated that no investigation was carried out by the military, even though it raises serious concerns about the military's conduct that may amount to war crimes.

Also in March 2016, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution on ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international law in the OPT. The HRC welcomed the CoI report and stressed its alarm at Israel's "long-standing systematic impunity for international law violations [that] has allowed for recurrence of grave violations without consequence" (page 2). The HRC further emphasized "the need to ensure that all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law are held to account through appropriate fair and independent national or international criminal justice mechanisms" (para. 4). The HRC also called upon the parties "to cooperate fully with the preliminary examination of the International Criminal Court and with any subsequent investigation that may be opened" (para. 5). Finally, the HRC

22 UN Col Report, para. 82.
24 Ibid, para. 96-99.
25 HCHR, supra note 5Ibid, para. 38.
26 UN Col, para. 293-299.
requested that the HCHR "conduct a comprehensive review detailing the status of implementation of the recommendations addressed to all parties since 2009 by the relevant Human Rights Council mechanisms, namely previous fact-finding missions, the commission of inquiry and special procedures, as well as by United Nations treaty bodies, by the Office of the High Commissioner and by the Secretary-General in his reports to the Human Rights Council, and to identify patterns of non-compliance, non-implementation and non-cooperation, to propose follow-up measures to ensure implementation, and to present a report to the Council at its thirty-fifth session" (para. 8).

In June 2017, the HCHR published the comprehensive review report on accountability.\textsuperscript{28} The report reviewed recommendations made between 2009 and 2016 by UN human rights mechanisms and bodies with an attempt to illustrate the extent of implementation of these recommendations, including Israel's compliance with international law and cooperation with these entities. The category of recommendations on accountability and access to justice represented 27% of the recommendations under review, the largest thematic area. The results of the report show that Israel did not implement 90% of the recommendations related to accountability and access to justice. It states that the "lack of accountability by Israel is illustrated by the general absence of higher-level responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law in the 2008/09, 2012 and 2014 conflicts in Gaza, with only a handful of convictions, if any, issued for minor violations, such as theft and looting."\textsuperscript{29} The HCHR noted Israel's "repeated failure to comply with the calls for accountability made by the entire human rights system" and urged Israel again to "conduct prompt, impartial and independent investigations of all alleged violations of international human rights law and all allegations of international crimes."\textsuperscript{30}

Despite repeated statements and recommendations by numerous UN officials and experts as well as local and international human rights organizations, the Israeli government and legal/judicial mechanisms show no inclination to implement or comply with any of these processes. This lack of compliance illustrates the need for new tools and follow-up measures to address impunity and the failure of Israeli domestic mechanisms.

VII. Obstacles to Investigations

IHL and IHRL require states to investigate allegations of suspected violations committed during armed conflict. The duty to investigate requires that any investigation follow the international standards of independence, impartiality, effectiveness, promptness and transparency and to prosecute those allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and international law.\textsuperscript{31}

As described above and reiterated by the different UN mechanisms, Israel's investigations into "Operation Protective Edge" fall far short of these international standards. The handling of the complaints submitted by Adalah and Al Mezan to the MAG and the AG clearly indicate the following:

- **No independence, impartial mechanism.** There is no independent and impartial investigatory mechanism, since the military is still the authorized body to investigate its own conduct. The MAG still performs a "dual role": It provides the military with legal advice prior to and during military operations and subsequently decides whether to initiate a criminal investigation. This

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, para. 20.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, para. 69.
\textsuperscript{31} See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/147 of 16 December 2005, which adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.
dual role could lead to a situation in which the MAG would need to decide whether to investigate its own conduct or that of its subordinates. Such a situation would clearly violate the requirement of independence and impartiality.

- **No clarity.** The MAG dismisses complaints by providing vague arguments and explanations about the existence of military necessity and military targets.
- **Few non-military testimonies collected.** In many cases, the FFAM is not investigating non-military witnesses and has stated that there is no need for such investigations.
- **No transparency.** The MAG is unwilling to disclose information on any investigative materials, witnesses and testimonies, which reinforces concerns about the lack of transparency.
- **No promptness.** There is no timeframe for examinations and investigations. There is an unreasonable amount of time and stalling in the examination and investigation processes, and thus the process is not prompt, but unnecessarily lengthy. Three years later, most reported incidents remain uninvestigated or without response.
- **No guidelines.** There are still no guidelines under which a criminal investigation should be opened in cases involving alleged IHL and IHRL violations.

These observations from OPE add to the longer experience of Adalah, Al Mezan and other human rights organizations with requests for investigation and litigation before the Israeli Supreme Court that shows:

- To date, the Israeli Supreme Court has never issued any order to the MAG to open a criminal investigation or to indict any individual regarding alleged suspicions of war crimes in Gaza. In the "Adalah case", which demanded investigations into the killings and injury of civilians and the extensive damage to homes in the Gaza Strip in 2004, the Court rejected the petition and reiterated its previous decisions in ruling in 2011 that intervention in the decisions of the chief military prosecutor is rare, and should occur only in very exceptional circumstances. ³²
- There is still no war crimes legislation in domestic Israeli law and there is no Israeli penal law imposing direct criminal liability on military commanders and political leaders for international law violations.
- The 2013 recommendations of the Turkel Commission do not fully comply with the international standards on the duty to investigate.
- Even with the numerous flaws of the Turkel Commission's recommendations, Israel has implemented almost none of the recommendations.
- Israel refused to cooperate with international investigatory bodies, most recently the UN Col into the 2014 war, and thus, UN investigators had no access to Israel and the OPT. This lack of cooperation thwarts attempts to gather information first-hand and view the scenes of relevant incidents in order to properly investigate violations of IHL and IHRL.

These findings clearly demonstrate Israel's unwillingness to genuinely investigate allegations of war crimes and other serious violations of international law, as well as its lack of intent to bring responsible perpetrators to justice. Even in the few cases where investigations have been conducted, it is clear that they are not done independently or impartially as required by international law, and in the end fail to produce any results that ensure accountability. The Israeli law enforcement system and its flawed investigative mechanisms instead appear primarily geared towards protecting its armed forces, thus allowing impunity to prevail.

³² HCJ 3292/07, Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Attorney General (decision delivered 1 December 2011).